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Official Receiver, 13 A. In the last mentioned case a Full Bench of this court summarised the result of the earlier decisions on this point in the words following:- "It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. 1413 perty" as an act by which the transferor conveys property in present or in future to the transferee or transferees.<br><br>15 to make any such direction to the superior officers. If so, the jurisdiction of the regular Magistrate would appear to be barred under section 55 of the Act, since it is,not suggested that there has been any order under section 85. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects  Advocates ([http://lawbesto.in great site]) or occupations or the like. But even for the transfer to operate in future the  Advocates ([https://lexlords.com/company-incorporation-and-llp/ great site]) decree which is the subject matter of the transfer must be in existence at the date of the transfer.<br><br>and this being  Advocates ([http://slachd.com/practice-areas/fathers-rights/ great site]) so, neither of those instruments can be held to have been an assignment "signed by the owner of the right within the meaning of the section. 429, for the purpose of construing section 232 of the Code. That application was dismissed. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.<br><br> A transfer of a decree by assignment in writing may be effected by conveying the decree in present or in future to the transferee. In Basroovittil Bhandari v. The authority under the Act has not been empowered under s. The charge-sheet filed by the police shows that the theft of the property involved in the case is Rs. There can also be no doubt that the offence has been committed within the limits of Manikpur.<br><br> The assignee was not brought on the record under section 372 of the 1882 Code corresponding to Order XXII, rule 10 of the present Code but the suit proceeded in the name of the original plaintiff and a decree was passed in his favour. No doubt when a person executes a document purporting to assign property to be afterwards acquired by him, that property on its acquisition passes in equity to the assignee: Holroyd v. The assignee then applied for execution of that decree claiming to be a transferee decree-holder under section 232 of the 1882 Code.<br><br> On the case as made on behalf of the respondent, orders of the superior officers were necessary to upgrade him from a daily wageearner to a higher cadre. It would appear, therefore, prima 1450 facie that by virtue of sections 51 and 52, the Panchayati Adalat of Manikpur had jurisdiction to try the case. It is also well-established by the decisions of this court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure".<br><br>there was no decree and no decree-holder. The State of Bihar(2). And so it has been held in several cases to which reference may now be made. Ramchandra Kamthi(1) the plaintiff assigned the decree to be passed in the pending suit. 523; but how such a subsequent acquisition can be held to relate back, so as to cause an instrument which on its date was not an assignment under the Act to become such an assignment, I am unable to understand.<br><br>The question of jurisdiction arises with reference to' the above provisions of the Act. This contention, therefore, fails", 1387 The above observations, to my mind, completely cover the present case. It seems to us that we should not be warranted in applying the doctrine of equity on which the appellant relies, which is stated in Palaniappa v. We think the words "decree-holder" must be construed as meaning decree-holder in fact and not as including a party who in equity may afterwards become entitled to the rights of the actual decree-holder, and that the words of the section relating to a transfer of a decree cannot be construed so as to apply to a case where there was no decree in existence at the time of the agreement".<br><br>On a parity of reasoning the respondent company may have, by operation of equity, become entitled to the benefit of the decree as soon as it was passed but to say that is not to say that there has been a transfer of the decree by the document of the 7th February 1949. What is necessary is that  Advocates ([https://lexlords.com/family/ imp source]) there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. The appellants have a right in equity to have the performing rights assigned to them and in that sense are equitable owners of those rights; but they are not assignees of the rights within the meaning of the statute.<br><br>Marshall, [1862] EngR 963; 10 H. , observed:- "We are asked to hold that in the event which happened in this case the appellant is entitled to be treated as the transferee of a decree from a decree holder for the purposes of section 332, notwithstanding that at the time of the assignment.