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119 must contravene those provisions and is, in consequence, beyond the ambit of authority conferred by s. Rana Mukherjee, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that the issue was directly covered by a recent decision of this Court reported as State of Kerala and others v. Sneha Cheriyan and another (2013) 5 SCC 160 and, therefore, the Full Bench decision impugned in this appeal is liable to be set aside. The Chairman and another member of the Tribunal decided the material issues 1 and 4 in favour of the first respondent to the effect that the 18th respondent had been duly proposed and seconded, that the Returning Officer had wrongly rejected his nomination paper and that as a result of that rejection the result of the election as a whole had been materially affected.
90(2) that the procedure of the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure in which 0. The other candidates got smaller number of votes which it is not necessary to set out here. But this is to ignore the restriction imposed by s. The election petition was enquired into by the Election Tribunal 181 consisting, of three persons, one of them being the Chairman. A number of issues were joined between the parties.
The learned Senior Counsel also took us through the relevant Rules, namely, Rule 7A, Rule 49, Rule 52 Advocates (discover this info here) and Rule 51A along with its proviso and submitted that this Court analyzed the above Rules with particular reference to Rule 7A(3) and the proviso to Rule 51A and held that in order for a teacher who was employed and subsequently relieved on account of termination of vacancies the services of such teacher should have been engaged for one full academic year as per Rule 7A(3) and that the said stipulation having been introduced in the Rule as and from 27.
We are accordingly of opinion that the contention of the appellants on this point is well-founded, and must be accepted as correct. The same becomes clear from the decision of this Court in the case of U. Buta Singh aforsaid, whose nomination paper had been rejected by the Returning Officer, did not take any further steps, But Dalip Singh, the first respondent, filed an election petition with the Election Commission, respondent 19. Assailing the judgment, Mr. 17 that the fact that a suit on the Advocates (basics) claim sought to be raised would be barred on the date of the application would be a material element in deciding whether it should be allowed or not but would not affect the jurisdiction of the court to grant it in exceptional circumstances as laid down in Charan Das v.
The third member of the Tribunal, while agreeing with the majority in their judgment on the other issues, disagreed with them on the most material issue in the case, namely, issue 4, and held that the first respondent had failed to prove, that the wrong rejection of the nomination paper of the 18th respondent had materially affected the result of the election. The Advocates (basics) learned Senior Counsel also submitted that though the decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Abdurahiman (supra) was affirmed by this Court which related to the appointment of a cook, the said judgment not having specifically examined the implication of the amended Rule 7A (3) and Rule 51A, the present decision in the case of Sneha Cheriyan (supra) of this Court alone would prevail and on that basis Advocates (basics) the law laid down by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court should be set aside.
2005, the claim of the 5th respondent by relying upon the unamended Rule 7A(3) could not have been countenanced. P State Electricity Board referred to supra, wherein a three judge bench had to adjudicate Advocates [basics] the operation of a subsequent general legislation in the following terms: Further, even the contention advanced on behalf of the respondent Math that a subsequent legislation takes precedence over a prior decision is liable to be rejected as the same is not tenable in law.
The appellants moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the majority judgment declaring the election to be void as a whole. The object of the said Act was to provide for better administration and governance of the affairs of the Temple and its properties. Thus, proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951, by which the estates belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Temple Act, 1955 are deemed to be Trust Estates is in direct contravention and subversion of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955.
17 is comprised, is to apply subject to the provisions of the Act, and the rules, and there being no power conferred on the Tribunal to extend the period of limitation prescribed, an order of amendment permitting a new ground to be raised beyond the time limited by s. The Tribunal sought to get over this difficulty by relying on the principle well established with reference to amendments under 0. On those findings they declared the election void as a whole and set aside the election of the appellants.
17, an order under that Rule cannot be made when a new ground or charge is raised, if the application is made beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing election petitions. As far as the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri is concerned, the State Legislature had already enacted the Temple Act, 1955 and vested the land belonging to the Temple in the Temple Management Committee by virtue of Sections 5 and 30 of the Act of 1955.
