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NRI legal services, https://lexlords.com/mediation/. If the provision relating to self-acquisition NRI Legal Services is applicable to all partitions, whether between collaterals or between the father and his sons, there is no conceivable reason why placitum 28, which occurs in the same chapter and deals with the identical topic should not be made applicable to all cases of partition and should be confined to collaterals alone. It is said that the exception in regard to father's gift as laid down in placitum 28 has reference only to partition between the donee and his brothers but so far as the male issue of the donee is concerned, it still remains partible.

His primary argument was that Schedule I of the Entry Tax Act itself made a clear distinction between packing materials, on the one hand, and raw materials, component parts and inputs, on the other, the Schedule making it clear that they were distinct and separate goods. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellants in which it was stated that the Bank became the absolute owner of the property after a sale certificate was issued on 22.

In respect of interest on Foreign Debt, the interest liability on the applicable Foreign Debt shall first be computed in the applicable foreign currencies and thereafter be converted to Rupees by adopting the Base Exchange Rate and such amount shall be adopted NRI Legal Services for the purposes of computing Interest on Debt. The reason for making this distinction is undoubtedly the theory of equal ownership between the father and the son ancestral property which we have discussed already and which in our opinion is not applicable to the father's gifts at all.

The position in law as it emerges from these authorities is thus summarised by Lewin on Trusts, Fifteenth fxEdition, page 324 :- "Powers, in the sense in which the term is commonly used, may be distributed into mere powers, and powers in the nature of a trust. The latter, on the other hand, are not discretionary, but imperative, have all the nature and substance of a trust, and ought rather, as Lord Hardwicke observed, to be designated by the name of trusts.

The Bank also pleaded that the Writ Petitioners did not have any right over the property which was purchased by it in the auction conducted by Court. Higgs(1) and Burrough v. Shri Patil, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Karnataka, countered these submissions, and stated that the High Court was absolutely correct in interpreting the Entry Tax Act and the two notifications in the manner that it did in Nestle case.

He argued that the context of the Entry Tax Act is most important and that decisions relatable to the Central Excise Act and to Sales Tax statutes would not therefore apply. Chatterjee however urged that the power conferred upon the bank or its officers duly authorised 201 in that behalf was a power in the nature of a trust, that there was a general intention in favour of a class and a particular intention in favour of individuals of a class to be selected by them and even though the particular intention failed from the selection not being made the court could carry into effect the general intention in favour of the class and that therefore the trust was valid.

This argument, in our opinion, is not sound. The Bank relied upon Section 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure to plead that it had perfected its right, title, interest and possession over the property covered by the sale certificate. , MUKHERJEA, DAS and CHANDRASE KHARA AIYER, J J, that though the Preventive Detention Act contemplates and requires the taking of an executive decision for confirming a detention order under s. Thus though it was denied that the plaintiffs were owners of the suit house, in the very next sentence defendant Bhanaram asserted that the question of ownership was not relevant in the instant suit.

(1) Mayane's Hindu Law, 11th edition,paragraph 280,page 344 254 Another argument is stressed in this connection which seems to have found favour with the learned Judges of the Patna High Court who decided the Full Bench case(1) referred to above. It was further accepted that he had paid rent by money orders sent in the name of Shyamji Gangji, father of the plaintiffs. He also argued that adverting to Section 5A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act would be of no help in the facts of the present case inasmuch as we are not concerned with industrial inputs but inputs as understood by the Entry Tax Act read with Schedule I.

The former are powers in the proper sense of the word-that is not imperative, but purely discretionary; powers which the trustee cannot be compelled to execute, and which, on failure of the trustee, cannot be executed vicariously by the court. He relied in support of this contention on Brown v. Bhanaram entered the witness box and in his cross-examination admitted that the lease from Nazul Department stood in the name of plaintiffs and that the witness himself had produced the same in some other proceedings.

Held also, per PATANJALI SASTRI C. According to him all the judgments cited by the appellants were distinguishable in that none of them pertain to any entry tax statute but were all under the Central Excise Act or Sales Tax statutes. Our conclusion, therefore, is that a property gifted by a father to his son could not become ancestral property in the hands of the donee simply by reason of the fact that the donee got it from his father or ancestor.

He further adverted to the definition of the expression goods contained in the Entry Tax Act and argued that unlike in the Central Excise Act and in Sales Tax statutes, goods need not be marketable, the definition confining goods to movable property without more.