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NRI legal services http://lexlords.ca; " He further points out that the procedure laid down by the Motor Vehi- cles Act and the rules for grant of fresh permits was not followed and that long before the application for renewal was allowed, the Regional Transport Authority had been informed of the decision of the High Court. The order of the Central Road Traffic Board was in his -opinion most unsatis- factory, as it was based on a quibbling distinction between "withdrawal" and "cancellation" of the permits.

I cannot, however, agree with the learned AttorneyGeneral that section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act does not contemplate the passing of a formal order. This is the cardinal principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case 10 case. otherwise we are faced with this absurd situation that with regard to every provisions in the deed of trust we have to visualize the trustees agreeing among themselves to carry it out by making a proposal and an acceptance.

The fourth respondent having obtained the benefit of temporary and permanent permits as a transferee from Balasubramania Pillai all this time cannot be heard now to say after the decision of this Court which has negatived his claim and upheld the claim of the applicant that the appli- cant should not enjoy the fruits of his success. So far as the first point is concerned, it seems to me to be quite correct to hold that article 166 (1) of the Constitution is confined to cases where the executive action requires to be expressed in the shape of a formal order or notification or any other instrument.

Neither revocation nor modification is possible without any order being made to that effect and yet section 13 like section 11 (1) does not speak of an order at all. Even so, the process of justice should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances. The first contention of the Attorney-General therefore cannot succeed. As has been said by Maxwell(2), "where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the perform- ance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconven- ience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and govern- ment of those on whom the duty is imposed, or in other words as directory only.

The High Court took the view that throughout all the stages prior to the High Court's decree, the parties, the transport NRI Legal Services authorities vested with the power to issue per- mits, and the Government also proceeded upon the footing that the transfer of the permits was dependent on the title to the buses and that Veerappa Pillai obtained the temporary and permanent permits only in his capacity as transferee and not in his individual right.

No award could be passed as in the meantime Writ Petition No. 80% was, however, deposited in Court on 18th April, 2006. 196 of 2006 (out of which Civil Appeal No. " In the present case the order under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act purports to be an order of the Government of Bombay and is signed by the officer who was competent to sign according to the rules framed by the Governor under article 166 of the Constitu- tion, and in these circumstances I am unable to hold that the order is a nullity even though it has not been expressed to be made in the name of the Governor.

It prescribes a formality for the doing of a public act. Even ii clause (1) of article 166 is taken to be an independent provision unconnected with clause (2) and having no relation to the purpose which is indicated therein, I would still be of opinion that it is directory and not imperative in its character. Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer.

NRI Legal Services</A> legal services" title="nri legal services (c) article.wn.com" style="max-width:400px;float:right;padding:10px 0px 10px 10px;border:0px;">6900/2009 has arisen) was instituted and interim orders were passed therein. The said writ petition, as already mentioned, was allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 1st March, 2007 by which the acquisition in question was set aside by the High Court Compensation, as required under Section 17(3A) i. In his view, the orders complained against deprived Messrs. This would be clear from the provision of section 13 of the Act which empowers the de- taining authority to revoke or modify a detention order any time it chooses.

The result is that both the grounds fail and the petition is dismissed. It is true that section 11 (1) does not speak of an order of confirmation but when there is an initial order of detention made under section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, it could normally be confirmed only by passing another order. To quote the learned Chief Justice:"the conduct of the parties, the attitude of the transport authorities including the Government are all explicable only on the assumption that the rights of parties were consequent on the ownership of the five vehicles in question.

nAct which provision had already been invoked by the Notification dated 5th May, 2004 under Section 4 of the Act. We have to lest the petitioners grounds on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate when- the case against him should be tried.