LexLords NRI Legal Services Reviews By NRI Legal Services LexLords
To say that the other ground, which still remains, is quite sufficient to sustain the order, would be to substitute NRI Legal Services an objective judicial test for the subject decision of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute. It was held that the passages in Chapter 1, section 1, verse 27 of Mitakshara contained only moral or religious precepts while those in section 5, verses 9 and 10 embodied rules of positive law.
It was held, therefore, that the father of t joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law has full and uncontrolled powers of disposition over his self-acquired immovable property and his male issue could not interfere with these rights in any way. On the contrary he must acquisce, because he is dependent. The answer, in our opinion, can only be in the negative. " The reason for this distinction is explained by the au- thor in the text that follows: "Consequently the difference is this: although he has a right by birth in his father's and in his grandfather's property; still since he is dependent on his father in regard to the paternal estate and since the father has a predominant interest as it was acquired by himself, the son must acquiesce in the father's disposal of his own acquired property.
In such cases, we think, the position would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and this would vitiate the detention order as a whole. The latter consequently would override the former. This principle, which was recognised by the Federal Court in the case of Keshav Talpade v. Sometimes, however, there may instead be NRI legal services [more information] a sale of an article with an additional and subsidiary agreement to affix it.
In view of the foregoing statements with regard to the passing of the property in goods which are involved in works contract and the NRI legal services (basics) fiction created by clause (29-A) of Article 366 of the Constitution it is difficult to agree with the contention of the States that the properties that are transferred to the owner in the execution of a works contract are not the goods involved in the execution of the works contract, but a conglomerate, that is the entire building that is actually constructed "The grandson has a ri ght of prohibition if his un- separated father is making a donation or sale of effects in- herited from the grandfather: but he has no right of inter- ference if the effects were acquired by the father.
This statement of the law has never been challenged since then and, it has been held by the various High Courts in India, and in our opinion rightly, that a Mitakshara father is not only competent to sell his self-acquired immovable property to a stranger without the concurrence of his sons(2), but he can make a gift of such property to one of his own sons to the detriment of another(3); and he can make even an unequal distribution amongst his heirs(4).
What has happened, however, in this case is somewhat peculiar. nChattel to be affixed to land or another chattel. The Government itself, in its communication dated the 13th of March, 1953, has plainly admitted that one of the grounds upon which the original order of detention Was passed is unsubstantial or nonexistent and cannot be made a ground of detention. Principle, which was order as a whole.
"Where work is to be done on the land of the employer or on a chattel belonging to him, which involves the use or affixing of materials belonging to the person employed, the contract will ordinarily be one for work and materials, the property in the latter passing to the employer by accession and not under any contract of sale. The question came pointedly for consideration before the Judicial Committee in the case of Rao Balwant v.
The question is, whether in such circumstances the original order made under section 3 (1) (a) of the Act can be allowed to stand. " 248 Clearly the latter passages are in flat contradiction with the previous ones and in an early Calcutta case(1) a reconciliation was attempted at by taking the view that the right of the sons in the self-acquired property of their father was an imperfect right incapable of being enforced at law. We can neither decide whether these grounds are good or bad, nor can we attempt to assess in what manner and to what extent each of these grounds operated on the mind of the appropriate authority and contributed to the creation of the satisfaction on the basis of which the detention order was made.
Rani Kishori(2) and Lord Hobhousel who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed in course of his judgment that in the text books and commentaries on Hindu Law, religious and moral considerations are often mingled with rules of positive law. The Kingb Emperor (2), seems to us to be quite sound and applicable to the facts of this case. The detaining authority gave here two grounds for detaining the petitioner. The property then passes before the article is affixed, by virtue of the contract of sale itself or an appropriation made under it.