The Lawyer In Chandigarh Diaries
But before noticing the proviso and its effect, it is necessary to mention the following facts which may be taken to have been made out on the record. Sale of Goods Act, 1930- Section 4 - Sale and agreement to sell (1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price. Any contrary opinion would go rise to large scale conflicts of claims and usages as to what is an essential religious practice with no acceptable or adequate forum for resolution.
The learned Solicitor General appearing for the appellant before us has Advocates - click here for more info - urged that there is no such inflexible rule of law as is assumed by the High Court, viz. (4) She went back to Pakistan in April, 1949, on the expiry of that temporary permit. The determination of the question as, to whether an interest created by such is deed is vested or contingent 89 has to be guided generally by the principles recognised under,ss. (1) Kumar Rani went to Karachi in July, 1948.
This proviso is as follows: It is peremptory in its scope and makes no exception for such a case, i. Moreover, there is some amount of uncertainty with regard to the prescription contained in the Agamas. in Shirur Mutt (supra) with regard to complete autonomy of a denomination to decide as to what constitutes an essential religious practice, a view that has also been subsequently echoed by this Court though as a minority view. (2) Her story that she went there temporarily for medical treatment has been doubted by the High Court and appears to us to be unfounded.
The development of this branch of jurisprudence primarily arises out of claimed rights of religious groups and denominations to complete autonomy and the prerogative of exclusive determination of essential religious practices and principles on the bedrock of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution and the judicial understanding of the inter-play between Article 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution in the context of such claims.
He has also drawn our attention to the case in Bernard v. The Ecclesiastical jurisprudence in India, sans any specific Ecclesiastical jurisdiction, revolves around the exposition of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 25 and 26 as made from time to time. That apart the complete autonomy contemplated in Shirur Mutt (supra) and the meaning of outside authority must not be torn out of the context in which the views, already extracted, came to be recorded (page 1028).
Even such a wife must be deemed not to be a citizen of India unless the particular facts bring her case within the proviso to article 7. Mohana Krishna Mudaliar (1). In such a situation one is reminded of the Advocates (my site) observations, if not the caution note struck by Mukherjea, J. (3) When she came to India in December, 1948, she did so on a temporary permit stating in her application for the Advocates - my site - said permit that she was domiciled in Pakistan and accordingly representing herself to be a Pakistani Advocates (my site) national.
Mountague(2) in which it was held, on a construction of the terms of the trust, that the payment of the debts was a condition precedent to the vesting of the interest devised therein. In The Commissioner, Hindu Shirur Mutt[6] (Shirur Mutt) while dealing with the issue of autonomy of a religious denomination to determine what rights and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of its religion it has been stated that - Under article 26(b), therefore a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.
(5) She made an attempt to obtain a permit for permanent return to India only after steps had been taken to vest the property in the Custodian and after the same was taken possession of. The learned Judges of the High Court relied on illustration (v) to s. Coupled with the above is the lack of easy availability of established works and the declining numbers of acknowledged and undisputed scholars on the subject. 19 of the Transfer of Property Act and s. 119 and 120 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
But we must hasten to clarify that no such view of the Court can be understood to an indication of any bar to judicial determination of the issue as and when it arises. 119 of the Indian Succession Act clearly indicate that if "a contrary intention appears" from the document that will prevail. Even if therefore article 5 can be said to be applicable to her on the assumption that Captain Narayan Singh was her husband and that her domicile was that of her husband, the facts bring her case under article 7.
Article 7 clearly overrides article 5. 19 and 21 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and ss. There is a proviso to this article which will be noticed presently. The exclusion of all outside authorities from deciding what is an essential religion practice must be viewed in the context of the limited role of the State in matters relating to religious freedom as envisaged by Articles 25 and 26 itself and not of the Courts as the arbiter of Constitutional rights and principles. There can be no doubt on these facts that she must be held to have migrated from the territory of India after the 1st March, 1947.
, of the wife migrating to Pakistan leaving her husband in India. , that " in spite of a clause requiring payment of debts before the property reaches the hands of the donee, the gift is a vested one. " He drew our attention to the fact that both s. There may be a contract of sale between one part-owner and another. 119 of the Indian Succession Act and the decision in Ranganatha Mudaliar v.
