Getting My Lawyer In Chandigarh To Work
From the above submissions and counter submissions of the parties as well as relevant statutory provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, Section 4(ii) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, Sections 4, 19 and 20 of the Sales of Goods Act and relevant provisions of the KGST Act and Rules noticed earlier, we find no difficulty in accepting the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant that the application of registration Advocates - click for source, is by law required to be made by or on behalf of the owner whose name is to be mentioned in the registration form along with relevant particulars of the vehicle such as engine number and chassis number and hence, registration of a motor vehicle is a post-sale event.
Learned counsel seeks to emphasise, that a closer examination of proviso (iii) of Section 2(2)(b) indicates, that for computing the periods mentioned in Section 8, the period during which a declaration under Section 12A is in force shall not be taken into account. It was contended, inter alia, that no notification under s. The position created by the Act, it is said, is not the same as Advocates (click this link now) the one that arises when work is -administratively distributed among Additional Judges of the same 136 Court because the jurisdiction and powers of the Judges are unaffected by such distribution and there remains the one Court with one inherent Advocates (click this link now) and territorial jurisdiction despite the distribution.
The appellant sued the State of Orissa for a declaration that the Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951 was in its application to the Kanika Raj, of which he was the Raja and owner, invalid, unconstitutional and ultra vires the State Legislature and for an injunction restraining the State of Orissa from taking any action under the Act. In order to substantiate his instant contention, he placed reliance on proviso (iii) of Section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA ACt, which provides for two further eventualities, wherein proceedings under the SAFEMA Act cannot be initiated, despite the detention of an individual under the COFEPOSA Act.
In our opinion the present provisions cannot be struck down as being in the nature of unreasonable restriction on the rights of the Mahant. It is the submission of the learned counsel, that proviso (iii) expressly postulates the possibility of a revocation of an order of detention, even after the declaration under Section 12A ceases to operate, under section 8 of the COFEPOSA Act. Obviously the appeal can be both on facts and on law and would relate not merely to the merits of the scheme but also to all basic matters whose determination is implicit in the very framing of a scheme.
The argument here runs that section 18 must be read with section 26, and as the High Court is empowered to divide Subordinate Judges in a district into classes it must mean that each class forms an independent Court, for according to this point of view, it would be anomalous to have Judges of the one Court invested with differing pecuniary jurisdictions because that is always regarded as inherent to the Court. Therefore, the appellant could not have availed of the right to challenge his order of detention, for the simple reason, that on the revival of the order of detention within the framework of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the appellant came to be released forthwith, namely, on the same day.
It has been strongly urged that a mere right to appeal to the High Court would virtually be in the nature of a limited appeal confined to challenge only on certain basic matters and probably limited to questions of law. But even apart from this, 20 150 it is difficult to visualise the situation which the ap- pellant contends for, of a Hindu joint family entering into a partnership with strangers through its karta and the junior members of the family also becoming at the same time its partners in their personal capacity.
The question that arises for our consideration, is based on the assertion, that the appellant did not raise any such challenge to the order of his preventive detention, during the subsistence of the order of his detention. Firstly, when an order of detention has been revoked under Section 12A of the COFEPOSA Act. 1276 of 1977 was filed by him for the first time on 19. It is clear, that the appellant came to be released on 21. In our considered view, question as to whether the appellants landholders were dispossessed from the land in question and the effect of the Repeal Act on this was not the issue in the earlier writ petition and, therefore, it cannot be held that the instant writ petition is barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata.
And secondly, where such an order of detention was revoked under Section 8 thereof. According to the second view, there are four classes of Subordinate Judge's Courts in the Punjab because of the High Court Notification. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent- State that the writ petition is barred by res judicata is also not sustainable in law. The right of appeal is given in very wide and general terms. It is submitted, that this right which was available to the appellant after the declaration under Section 12A came to be revoked, was really not available to him, because the appellant came to be released on 21.
According to the learned counsel, that however should make no difference whatsoever. 3(1) of the Act vesting Advocates; click this link now, the Kanika Raj in the State of Orissa could issue as the Raj was not an estate as defined by s. We can find no warrant for any such apprehension. 1977, and Special Civil Application No. For this, reference has been made to Section 12A(6), which expressly finds mention in proviso (iii) of Section (2)2(b) of SAFEMA Act. The contrary was asserted by the State of Orissa and its further contention was that the appellant was estopped by a compromise decree between his predecessors-in- title on the one band and the Secretary of State on the other from denying that the Raj was an estate as defined by the Act.
