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NRI legal services - http://lexlords.uk. In any event, the considerations of hardship urged upon us may make it desirable that a period of deten- tion should be fixed but this cannot alter the plain meaning of the language of the section. It fol- lows, therefore, that the specification of the period of detention does not destroy or abridge the wide over-all power of the appropriate Government to direct the continua- tion of the detention as long as it thinks fit. But cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Therefore, the authority to extend the period of detention previously fixed which, in view of our decision, must be held to exist, will have to be derived from the very words "may continue such detention for such period as it thinks fit". In such an event the judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evi- dence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept.

I do not see why we should impute such dere- liction of duty to the appropriate Government; but even if we do so and insist on the specification of the period of detention we shall perhaps be driving the appropriate Gov- ernment to fix the longest permissible period of detention ending with the expiry of the Act itself and then to lose sight of the case of the detenu. Here is a suggestion for re-drafting the main paragraph of Section 28. But if it does think fit to do so, it will not be for the Court to question the knowledge, wisdom or patriotism of the Legislature and to permit its dislike for the policy of the law to prevail over the plain meaning of the language used by the Legislature.

At this juncture, it is important to note the fact situation in a typical case before us. It is also pointed out that purchasers may be spread all over India and it is not convenient or practicable for all of them to go to the place of removal of goods and apply for refund. 530 Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to. Section 13 of the Act gives power to the appropriate Government to revoke or amend a detention order which must mean the initial order of detention under section 3 of the Act but not an order made under section 11 (1) confirming a detention order or fixing a period of detention.

18646-19117 of 2015 narrates the factual position thus It has also been contended on behalf of the land-owners that the land is lying unutilized till date and, in fact, in a recent meeting of the Government convened by the Chief Secretary of the State it was expressed that the impugned acquisition need not be proceeded with any further Possession of the land prior to the passing of the Award could not have been taken and that too by payment of 80% of the estimated compensation at a point of time subsequent to the taking over of possession.

The Karnataka Appellate Tribunal in an order dated 18. From what source does the appropriate Government derive its power to direct the fur- ther continuation of the detention after having, in the order of confirmation, once specified the period of deten- tion ? If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. 2010 in Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. " For all I know, such drastic and extensive power to continue the detention as long as it may think fit may not be given by Parliament to the executive Government in a permanent statute.

620 following passage in his judgment in S. The State of Punjab, where it has been held that there is nothing in section 11 (1) to prevent the appropri- ate Government from directing the detention of a person to continue further so long as the period fixed by the previ- ous order has not expired and the person has not been released. 226 of the Constitution to the High Court of Madras for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, the Central Road Traffic Board and the State of Madras, and for a writ of mandamus to the respondents to transfer, issue or grant 584 permanent permits to the petitioner, the High Court set aside the order of the Central Traffic Board, relying mainly on the fact that the petitioner's title to the five buses had been established and directed the Regional Traffic Authority to grant to the petitioner permits in respect of the five buses: Where, in a dispute between two rival claimants for running through a particular route five buses, which each of them alleged he had purchased from a third person, the Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, after calling for a report from the Regional Transport Officer and considering several circumstances that had a material bearing on the case, restored the permanent permits which had been granted to one of the claimants, but on an application by the other claimant under Art.

584 of 1951, Chakar Singh v. The Static of Madras (suprat) at page 639 with which I concurred "It may be pointed out that Parliament may well have thought that it was unnecessary to fix any maximum period of detention in the new statute which was of a temporary nature and whose own tenure of life was limited to one year. " 621 Therefore, the power conferred on the appropriate Government by this sub-section will be exhausted by its single exercise and it will not be possible to extend the period of deten- tion any longer.

Again, if the idea of indefinite detention were so repugnant as to induce us to construe sub-section 11 (1) by reading into it the requirement that the period of detention must be specified at the time the order of detention is confirmed, it will lead us to a situation which cannot be maintained in view of a decision of this Court. This practical inconvenience or hardship, as it is called, cannot be a ground for holding that the provisions introduced by the 1991 (Amendment) Act are a device or a ruse to retain the taxes collected illegally and to invalidate them on that ground " assuming that such an argument is permissible in the case of a taxing enactment made by Parliament.

nAct having been subsequently waived and the objections of the land-owners having been heard, the State could not have, once again, reverted to invoke the provisions of Section 17(1) of the L. In this regard, it has also been contended that taking over of possession of the land on 17th March, 2016 was without adequate notice and furthermore that the possession taken over was only symbolic/paper possession.

It is said that if we insist on a specification of a definite period when the confirmatory order is made and thereafter each time the period of detention is extended then the appropriate Government will have to apply its mind to the case of the detenu before it will make an order for further continuation of the detention, but that if we say that no time need be specified, the appropriate Government will lose sight of the case and the detenu will be detained indefinitely.

if the purchaser wants to apply for refund " it is submitted " he has to go to the place where the duty has been paid by the manufacturer and apply there. So far as the detenu is con- cerned, his detention Wilt 622 not be any more definite and less irksome if it is open to the appropriate Government to continue the detention by an indefinite number of orders made from time to time until the expiry of the Act itself by efflux of time in the case of a temporary statute or by its repeal in the case of a perma- nent Act.

Apart from this consideration, there is a period specified in the sub-sec- tion itself, for as soon as the appropriate Government will cease to think fit to continue the detention it will revoke the detention order under section 13 and the period of detention will automatically come to an end. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it.

The validity of the detention of the petitioner has been challenged before us on a two-fold ground. If the specification of the period of detention is not at all sacrosanct and the appropriate Government may nevertheless continue the detention as long as'it thinks fit to do so, why is the specification of a period to be regarded as vitally or at all necessary ? Such temporary statutes cease to have any effect after they expire, they automatically come to an end at the expiry of the period for which they have been enacted and nothing further can be done under them.

It has to ascertain the inten- tion of the Legislature from the language used in the Act. The first ground urged is that it was imperative on the part of the appropri- ate Government, when it confirmed the order of detention under section 11 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act, to specify the period during which the detention was to contin- ue; and an omission to state the period vitiates the order. That, I apprehend, will do no good to the detenu.

Section 13 gives ample power to the appropriate Government to revoke the detention order at any NRI legal services (view site…) time and it is expected that it will apply its mind to each case and revoke the detention order and release the detenu as soon as it is satisfied that his detention is no longer necessary. The Court is not concerned with any question of policy. This view of the matter will, however, run counter to our decision in Petition No.

3 On a consideration of all aspects of the matter, we recommend that Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 should be suitably amended so as to amend to render invalid contractual clauses which purport to extinguish, on the expiry of a specified term, right accruing from the contract. According to this decision the appropriate Government may direct the detention to continue even after the expiry of the period fixed by the order confirming the detention order or any subsequent order provided such direc- tions are given before the expiry of the period fixed by the immediately preceding order.

The detention of the peti- tioners therefore is bound to come to an end automatically with the life of the statute and in these circumstances Parliament may well have thought that it would be wholly unnecessary to legislate and provide a maximum period of detention for those detained under this law. The NRI Legal Services section, it will be noticed, does not authorise the appropriate Government to "continue the detention for such period as it thinks lit from time to time.

True it is that there is this practical inconvenience but it must also be remembered that such claims will be filed only by purchasers of high-priced goods where the duty component is large and not by all and sundry/small purchasers.